DIGEST OF IMPORTANT DECISIONS
RUPORTBD IN DECEMBER, 1892.
Cross References, etc., by HENRY N. SmALTZ.
The following DIGEST is rather an indication of what the editors and
those who are sele.cting the cases hope to make it than an example of
the completeness which it is hoped will be attained in the February and
subsequent issues of Tim AmMRICAN LAW REGISTER AND RvIsw.
Thus the reader will observe that cases on M]EDIcAL JURISPRUDENcE,
RAILWAYS AND TRANsPoRTAT-IoN COmPAxES, PERSONAL RELATIONS,
CONFLIcT OF LAWS, INTERNATIONAL LAWS and INsURANcu are omitted,
while Cc5RPORATION CAsES have not been selected by Mr. John A.
McCarthy, who will, in future, take charge of this important branch.
By the February number we expect to have the Department in thorough
working order. Any suggestions from our subscribers, as to divisions of
departments and cross references, will be most welcome.

COMMERCIAL LAW.
Cases selected by FRANcIs H.
ASSIGNMENT. See EQUITY, 6.
BAILMENT. See CRIMINAL LAW, 4.
BILL OF LADING.

BOHLEN.

x. Purchaserfor Value.
A & Co., merchants of New York, had advancQd money thr6ugh their
agent, B, to tomato growers upon their 1883 crop, which was canned aiid
stored, the warehouse receipts being made outto B's "agent" and given to
him. He had power to sell the tomatoes, and did so sell some. Instead of
turning in the proceeds to Ak he, on his own account, invested the money
in the 1884 crop, which was warehoused in the name of B's agent. B
obtained loans upon receipts for 1883 and 1884 from the defendant bank,
*indorsing to them the receipts. The debt not being paid the tomatoes
were sold. Held, that A might recover against bank the amount realized from the sale of 1883 crop. They were goods of A. B had no title in
them, and though he had authority to sell could not pledge them without
A's consent. The bank had notice from warehouse *receipts that B
was not owner, and the burden rested upon them to ascertain the actual
owifership and whether B had authority to pledge. As to proceeds of
sale of 1884 crop, A could not recover. B, by misapplying A's money to
their purchase, might give A equitable lien upon them so far as his
money was used in the purchase, but the goods were bought by B for
himself, and not for A, and B never intended to give A a title to them,
nor did A know of the purchase, and the title was in B. Theuber v.
Cecil Nat. Bank, MORRIS J., 52 Fed. Rep., 513.

COMMERCIAL

BILLS AND NOTES.
CONTRACTS.

LAW.

See _;fra, 6; EquITy, I.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAWV, 3, 4,

To.

2. Abandonment of,-Theory of FutureProfits.
To justify the abandonment of the future performance of a contract,
and to bring suit to recover future profits where performance is a condition precedent to the right to receive profits, the conduct of 'the
defendant must be such as prevented the innocent party from executing
the contract. It is not enough that substantial provisions of the contract
bave been broken. Lake Shore, etc., Rwy. Co. v. Richards, Supreme
Court of Illinois, Oct. 31, 1892, BAILEW, C. J., 32 N. B.. 402.
The same breach which may justify the party not in default in rescinding the contract, will not entitle him to refuse farther'performance
and yet maintain an action for future profits.
In the Federal Courts, -when a party fails to perform every material
part of any one installment of a divisible contract, the other party may
treat the contract as at an end and refuse to perform his part farther.
Wright v. Norrington, iI5 U. S., 188 (also in N. Y. and Pa.); Pope v.
Porter io2, N. Y.; Rugg & Bayan v. Moore, iio Pa., 236); but to entitle
a party.not in default to future profits it must be shown that his performance was prevented by the act of the party committing the breach.
U. S. v. Behan, 11O U. S., 388. It is not necessary that the performance
be rendered physically impossible, an act equivalent to a breach by
anticipation of the entire contract is sufficient. If such be shown, the
entire contract is broken and damages for the breach of the entire contract, which, of course, would include the loss of future profits, may be
recovered. The necessity of a tender of performance on the plaintifis
part is done away with by the defendant's declaration, express or implied,
that he will not perform his part in return, for no one need perform his
portion of a contract with the knowledge that he will not reap the consideration for his performance.
3. Assignment of,-Indorsements in Bank- Title by Estoppfel.
C, as president of Bangor Co., sold to A a certificate of its stock, transferring it to him by an indorsement in blank. A kept his stock in same
safe as one D, a broker, who stole the'certificate and sold it to B for value
and without notice. A and B both claimed to own stock. C and the
Co. interplead. Held (I), Mraine statute that transfer of shares of corporate stock by indorsement and delivery shall only be valid between
parties thereto, does not render transfer void in this case. The parties
are the transferrer C, and whoever is entitled to have his name inserted
in blank indorsement, and between them transfer is valid, the suit being
brought to ascertain who is so entitled. (2) That by-keeping securities
in same safe as D, who stold them, A did not so hold D out as having
authority to deal with them as to mislead B, and so fall within the rule that
where one of two innocent persons must suffer from fraud of third person,
he must bear the loss who placed it in the power of third person to commit the fraud. (3) While certificates of stock indorsed in blank have a
certain quasi negotiability, an innocent purchaser of a stolen certificate

COMMERCIAL

LAW.

does not acquire title against the owner as in case of negotiable promissory notes, etc. Decree that A's name be inserted in blank transfer in
certificate, and Co. issue new certificate in return therefor: Bangor Light
Co. v. Robinson, PUTNAM J., 57 Fed. ltep., 520.
4.

Breach o,-Damages-MentalSuffering.

In an action against a railroad company for breach of contract to run
a special train, the plaintiff claimed damages for "great distress of
mind, anxiety, mortification and suspense" in failing to reach the bedside of a sick parent in consequence of said breach. It was held that the
action could not be maintained: Wilcox v. Richmond and D. Rwy.
Co., Circuit Court of*Appeals of the United States, Fourth Circuit, October
It, 189, HUOHIS, J., 52 Fed. Rep., 264.
5.

Breach of-Telegraph Compianies-Delay in "Transmitting
Message.
C left a despatch at defendant's telegraph office in S., to be forwarded to plaintiff at M. "The despatch was: "Strauss gone to Howard.
Gave man gold watch by mistake. Left no word with me. Store
closed. Answer." Strauss was a clerk whom plaintiff had left in charge
of his jewelry st6re in his absence, and during the night or early
in the morning before'the despatch was sent had robbed the store and
absconded with the property, and the despatch was in relation to the
absconding, but defendant's "agent had no notice thereof. The despatch
remained in the S. office an hour and a half and was then forwarded to
the M. office, where it remained two hours before it was delivered, or any
effort made to deliver it. Held, that plaintiff could not recover more
than the cost of the znessage and incidental expenses, upon the principle
that where two persons have made a contract, which one of them has
broken, the damages which the other party ought to receive in respect
to such breach of contract should be such as may fairly and reasonably
be considered either arising naturally, i. e., according to the usual course
of things, from such breach of contract itself, or such as may reasonably
be supposed to have been in the contemplation of both parties at the
time they made the con-tract, as the probable result of the breach of it:
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Cornwell, Court of Appeals of Colorado,
October 24, 1892, RmD, J., 3I Pac. Rep., 393.
These cases follow Telegraph Co. v. Hall, 124 U. S., 244, and Griffin
v. Colver, i6 N. Y., 489. The rule is that only such damages can be
recovered as, are the natural consequences of the breach of a contract
under the circumstances known to the parties: BLACKBURN, J., Cory v.
Thames Co., L. R., 3 Q. B., at p. 186. Where goods are shipped, the
carrier is only liable for the ordinary result of delay. - The fact that the
shipper lost a more than ordinarily advantageous contract thereby can
not affect the damages, the shipper not having notified the carrier of that
fact: Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Exch., 341. It is not necessary that the
damage be actually contemplated by the parties as the consequences of
the breach if they would naturally and in ordinary course result therefrom: Cory v. Thames Co., p. 189. The damages must be certain both
in their nature and in respect to the cause from which they proceed.

CONSTITUTIONAT.

LAW.

6.

Contingent Contract-DeliveJy of 2%oles on Determinationof
CriminalProsecution.
Plaintiff, having bought certain property of one Ireland, sold the
same, taking certain promissory notes in payment. Ireland was subsequently charged in a criminal, prosecution with the larceny of said
property as the bailee of defendant. Thereupon plaintiff delivered said
notes to defendant, with the express agreement that defendant should
retain them in case of Ireland's conviction, but that it should return them
to plaintiff in case of Ireland's acquittal. Neither plaintiff nor defendant
were implicated in said criminal charge, and the transaction concerning
the delivery of the notes not being intended as a compromise of a
criminal offence, nor an attempt to prevent the due administration of
justice, it was held that the contract was not illegal, but that it was based
upon a valid consideration, and that it could be enforced upon the
happening of the contingency specified in the express agreement:
Percheron-Norman Horne Co. v. Downen, Supreme Court of Colorado,
E..IOTT, J., November 7, 1892, 3 r Pac. Rep., 5oi.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
Cases selected by VILLIA-M STRUTHERS ELIAS.
FIDERAL.
DUE PROCESS OF LAw.

z. Amending CorporateClbrter.
Where a corporation was chartered, subject to amendment and repeal
at the will of the general assembly, an act requiring corporations to pay
employees' wages weekly, excepting from its provisions religious, literary
and charitable corporations, is a reasonable exercise of the right to amend
such a charter, and it is no objection to its constitutionality that such
corporations were excluded as only had capital stock or existed for mere
pecuniary gain ; nor is any corporation a citizen of the United States,
nor a person within the meaning of United States Constitution, Amendment 14, see. i; State v. Browne Mfg. Co., Supreme Court of Rhode
Island, ROGERS, J., October 3, 1892, 25 Atlantic, 246.
EXTRADITION.
2. Arrest and Trialfor Different Charges.
Under United States Constitution, Article IV, Section 2, which requires
fugitives from justice found in a State other than the one in which the
crime was committed to be surrendered on demand to the authorities
of the State having jurisdiction of the offense, a fugilive who has been
extradited on papers charging him with grand larceny may be tried
under an indictment charging him with robbery when the two charges
are based on the sarne facts; there being nothing in the Statutes of Congress regulating interstate extradition, or in the laws of the State from
which the fugitive was extradited, prohibiting an arrest and trial on
different charges: People ex rel., Post :'. Cross. Sheriff, Court of Appeals
of New York, O'BRIEN, J., October 18, R 92, N. E. Rep., Vol. 32, p. 246.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
IMPAIRING OBLIGATION OV CONTRACTS.

3.

Legislation Affecting PriorJudgments.

The provision in the United States Constitution that "no State shall
pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts," does not forbid a State
from legislating, within its discretion, to reduce the rate of interest upon
judgments previously obtained in its courts; nor does a State statute of
such character deprive the judgment creditor of his property without due
process of law: Morley v. Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Railway Co.,
Supreme Court of United States, SHIRAS. J. i HARLAN, FIELD and
BREWER, JJ., dissenting), November 14, 1892, 146 U. S., 162.
4. Legislation Amending FormerAct.
Where a State Act chartering a railway company and making it lawful for the county court of any county to subscribe to the stock of said
railway company is amended by a subsequent act which compels said
courts to first submit the question of such subscription to a vote of the
people, held that the latter Act does not violate the inhibition of the
Constitution of the United States against "impairing the obligation of
contracts" where the provisions of. the former Act were not acted on
prior to the passage of the latter: Wilson v. Polk County, Supreme Court
of Missouri, GANTT, J., November 14, 1892, 20 Southwestern, 469.
INTERSTATE COMMERCE.

5. MZeat Inspection Laws.
Following the ruling of Minnesota v. Barber (136 U. S., 313), it was
held, that the Act of March 31, 1889, concerning the inspection before
slaughter of cattle intended for human food, was in -violation of the
Cbnstitution of the United States in so far as such act provided that fresh
meats, sound, healthy and fit for human food, cannot lawfully, be shipped
into this State to be sold, except upon condition that the aimal or
animals from which such meats have been taken shall have been
inspected and certified by the State inspectors within forty-eight hours
before slaughter: Schmidt v. People, Supreme Court of Colorado, November 7, 1892, per curiam, 31 Pacific Rep., 498.
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORS.

6.

Appffointment of.

Under the Constitution of the United States the legislatures of the
several States have exclusive power to direct the manner in which the
electors for president and vice-president shall be appointed. Congress
having the power to prescribe the day on which presidential electors
shall meet in the several States, and having fixed a certain day a State
law in as far as it prescribes a different day is void: McPherson v.
Blacker, Supreme Court of United States, FULLER, C. J., October 17,
1892, 146 U. S., I.
STATE.
CLASS

LEGISLATION.

7. Stock Running at Large.
A city ordinance which prohibits stock from running at large in
certain portions of the city is not objectionable, on the ground that

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
it is class legislation. Special laws applicable to particular localities,
highways and streets of a city are necessary to the safety and convenience of its citizens, and are valid, unless they are unreasonable, or
violate fundamental law: Mayor, etc., of Chattanooga v. Norman,
Supreme Courtof Tennessee, SNODGRASS, J.,. November IS, 1892, 20
Southwestern, 417.
EMINENT DOMAIN.

8. Special Taxation.
A city condemned land through the middle of two lots for an alley,
and levied a special tax on said lots according to their frontage on such
alley to pay for the land so taken. Held, that the proceedings were
unconstitutional, as being an abuse of the power to enforce special taxation upon contiguous property for local improvements, and as taking
private property for public use without just compensation: City of
Bloomington v. Latham, Supreme Court of Illinois, MAGRUDER, J.
(CRAIG, J., dissenting), November 2, 1892, 32 Northeastern, 5o6.

IMPRISONMENT
9.

1VOR DEBT.

A State Act providing that "it shall be unlawful for any person or
persons, firms or corporations or companies, to refuse to cash any checks
or script of their own that may be presented it within thirty days of its
date of issuance," andnmaking it "' a misdemeanor for any person, etc., to
refuse to redeem in lawful currency any such checks, etc.," violates
the spirit if not the letter of that clause in the constitution of the State
prohibiting the legislature from passing any law authorizing imprisonment for debt in civil cases." State v. Paint Rock Coal & Coke Co.,
Supreme Court of Tennessee, HENDERSON', Special J., November 19,
1892, 2o Southwestern, 499.
INALIENABLE RIGHTS.
io. Interference wit/h Right of Contracting.
An Act which requires the operators and owners of coal mines,
where the miner is paid on the basis of the amount of coal mined by
him, to compute the compensation upon the weight of the coal unscreened and weighed on pit cars, is unconstitutional within the Constitution of Illinois, Article II, Section 2, as depriving persons without
due process of law of the property right of making contracts: Ramsey
v. People, Supreme Court of Illinois, BAILEY, C. J., October 31, 1892,
N. E. Rep., Vol. 32, p. 364.
LEGISLATURE.
mm. Enactment of Statutes.
Although the provisions of the constitution of a State forbid the legislature to pass any appropriation or revenue bill during the last five days
of the session, their disregard by the legislature is beyond the reach of the
courts, which deal only with what the legislature does, not with what it
should have done or omits to do. Such provisions, while authoritative
and mandatory on the legislature, are not for the consideration of the

CRIMINAL LAW.
courts, which must accept as legislative enactments, duly passed as prescribed by the constitution, all such acts as are duly authenticated as such
in the mode prescribed by it. Hurt v. Wright, Sup. Ct. of Mississippi,
October 15, 1892, CAMPBEL.IL, C. J., ii Southern, 6o8.
SPECIAL LEGISLATION.
12.
Tax Levied for County Institution.
A State law which attempts to authorize any county of the State to
raise money "by a tax upon all taxable property within the county," to
secure the location therein of an institution to be controlled wholly by a
board appointed by the governor, and which provides for the furnishing
of information to the people of the State at large as to the work of such
institution, exclusively by the board and State officers, at the expense of
the State, is a law of a general and not a local character, notwithstanding incidental benefits may accrue to property near such institution by
reason of its location, and such a law is unconstitutional as being in
conflict with that clause of the constitution of the State of Ohio which
-provides that all taxes for general revenue for the State must be levied
by a uniform rule upon all the taxable property within the State.
Watson v. Commissioners of Wayne Co., Supreme Court of Ohio,
SPEAR, C. J., Novenber i, 1892, 32 Northeastern, 472.

CRIMINAL LAW.
Cases selected by C. PgRcy WILLcox.
ASSAULT.
i. Threatr no Justification.
One is not justified in comiiitting an assault and battery on another
who is making no hostile demonstration against him, although.threats
against the accused made by the person assaulted have been communicated to him: Martin v. State, 32 N. B., 595, Appellate Court of
Indiana, Nov. 30, 1892, Fox, J.
EXTRADITION.
2.

See COXSTITUTIoNAL LAW, 2.

Trialfor Different Charge.

One extradited for grand larceny may be tried for robbery where the
,two charges are based on the same facts, there being nothing in the
:statutes of Congress or of the State from which the prisoner was extra.dited prohibiting an arrest and trial on different charges: People v.
-Cross, 32 N. R., 246, Court of Appeals of New York, October 18, 1892,
.O'BRInN, J.
IMPRISONMENT POE DEBT.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 9.

3INDICTMENT.

.3. Quashing.
The fact that a stenographer was permitted to take notes before the
grand jury is not sufficient ground for quashing an indictment, if no
substantial rights of the -accused were prejudiced thereby: Courtney v.
State. 32 N. E., 335, Appellate Court of Indiana, November 16, 1892,
BLACK, J.

CRIMINAL PRACTICE.

4. Sufficienc1y
It is sufficient in an indictment for larceny to describe the property
stolen as "six dollars in money." Such a description is not repugnant
to the provision of the Constitution guarantying to every person accused
of crime the right "to demand the nature and cause of the accusation
against him :" Randall v. State,*32 N. B., 305, Supreme Court of Indiana,
October 27, 1892,. McBRiDE, J.
LARCENY.

5. Znteazt-Ownership.
One who samples some bales of cotton by permission of the bailee,
but with an intent to appropriate such samples to his own use, is guilty
of larceny. The property in such cotton is rightly laid in the bailee,
who had the custody thereof. State v. McRea, I6 S. R., 173, Supreme
Court of North Carolina, November 17, 1892, CLARK, J.
MURDER.

See EVIDENcE, 6, 7.

LIQUOR LAVVS.
6. Election of Offence for Conviction.
In a prosecution for an unlawful sale of liquor, the State must elect
upon which sale it will rely for a conviction where the evidence tends to
show several sales: State v. Lund, 31 Pacific, 309, Supreme Court of
Kansas, November , 1892, JOHNSTON, J.
NUISANCE.
7. Vicious Dog.
A dog which persistently assails people passing along a public road
is a public nuisance, and may be killed by any person so assailed: Nehr
v. State, 53 N. W., 589, Supreme Court of Nebraska, November lo, 1892,
MAXWEuL, C. 3.
SUNDAY LAW.
8. Sporting.
Playing baseball on Sunday is "sporting" within the meaning of
the statute punishing those "who shall on Sunday engage in sporting:"
State v. O'Rourk, 53 N. IV., 591, Supreme Court of Nebraska, November
10, 1892, MAXWELL, C. J.

CRIMINAL PRACTICE.
Cases selected by C. PERCY VILLCOX.
MOTION FOR NEw TRIAL.
i. Evidence in Support of.
In support of a motion for a new trial the defendant's counsel has a:
right to put in evidence a copy of a newspaper giving an account of the
trial prejudicial to the prisoner, which was read to the jury before they
decided on their verdict.

EQUITY.

EQUITY.
Cases selededy ROBERT P. BRADFORD.
ACCIDENT AND MISTAKE.
r. Mfutual 'istakeof Fact.
Plaintiff indorsed certain papers, supposing them to be negotiable
notes. Upon flight of the principal the plaintiff was called on for payment by a bank which had discounted the instruments, also supposing
they were negotiable notes.
Plaintiff, after paying a portion of the
instruments, refused farther payment on the ground that they were not
negotiable notes. In this he was sustained by the court But in an
action against the bank to recover the amount he had paid before dis-"
covering he was not liable it was held that he could not recover, since
the mistake was made about a matter equally open to the ifiquiry of
both parties and it was immaterial that plaintiff supposed that he was
subrogated to certain security on such payment: Alton v. First Nat. Bank
of Webster, Supreme Court of Massachusetts, October 22, 1892, HoLmzs,
J., 32 N. E. Rep., 228.

-

AccoUNT.
2. Co-Owners of Vessel.
Matters of account between part owners of property belong to a court
of equity, and the fact that such property is a vessel does not bring the
case within the jurisdiction of a court of admiralty: The Larch, 3 Ware,
28, 34 and The Charles Heinge, 5 Hughes, 359, disapproved; The H. B.
Willard, Circuit Court of the United States, District of Maine, October
8, 1892, GRAY, J., 52 Fed. R., 387.
3. Right of CorporationStockholder to Compel.
In the absence of statutory authority a court of equity has no
jurisdiction to dissolve a corporation, nor can a stockholder by suit in
equity compel an accounting between the corporation and its creditors
unless it appears that the business is conducted in bad faith, or that the
interests of the stockholders would be promoted by a different policy:
Wheeler v. Pullman Iron & Steel Co., Supreme Court of Illinois, October
31, 1892, SHOPE, J., 32 N. W. Rep., 420.
ADJUSTMENT.

4. Subrogationof Purchaserat JudicialSale.
A purchaser at a void execution or judicial sale is entitled to be subrogated to the rights of those creditors to the payment of whose claims
the purchase money has been appropriated, but the purchaser must show
that such payment has been made; and an answer filed by the purchaser,
in which he avers that the land was sold to satisfy creditors of the estate
in which such homestead was claimed and asks to be subrogated to the
rights of such creditors, is demurrable if it fails to show that the purchase
money was appropriated to their claims: Bond v. Montgomery, Supreme
Court of Arkansas, November 12, 1892, BATTLE,

3.,

20 S. W. Rep., 525.

EQUITY.
CuARmIEs, TRUSTS FOR.

5.

Validiy,.

While the same particularity is not required in charitable trusts as in
ordinary express trusts, yet it must sufficiently appear that the donor
(testator) designed to establish *a charity, and the object must be indicated with sufficient clearness to enable the court, by means of its settled
*doctrines, to carry the design into effect. Therefore, a bequest in trust
for "the education of young men for the priesthood or to educate individual orphan boys or orphan girls" is void for uncertainty: Brennan
z. Vinkler, Supreme Court of South Carolina, November 3, 1892,
McGowAN, J., 16 S. E. Rep., i9o.
EQE"ITABLE ASSIGNMENT.

6. Contingent Fee.
There is a clear distinction between an actual assignment of a part
of a fund and 4 mere promise to pay out of such fund. Consequently an
agreement by a client to pay his attorney a reasonable compensation for
his services, to be paid out of the proceeds of a proposed lawsuit, does
not amount to an equitable assignment of an interest in the subjectmatter of the litigation: Hall v. Culver, Supreme Court of Illinois,
October 31, 1892, BAXER, J., 32 N. R. Rep., 265.
FORECLOSURE SUIT.

7. Priorities."
A lawyer employed by a railroad company at a fixed salary in a State
where the road is in course of construction, but not yet in operation, is
not entitled, on the appointment of a receiver in foreclosure proceedings,
to receive payment out of the proceeds of the sale prior to the satisfaction
of the mortgage bonds, even though earnings of the road have been
improperly diverted from current expenses for the benefit of bondholders;
for the equity to a return of diverted earnings applies only in favor of
those who have helped to keep the road a going concern. Fosdick v.
Schal], 99 U. S., 235, distinguished; Finance Co. of Penna. v. Charleston
C. & C. R. Co. (Moon, intervener), Circuit Court of the United States,
District of South Carolina, November 8, 1892, SIMONTON, J., 52 Fed. R.,
526.
FRAUD.

See PILEADING, I; PROPERTY, 2.

Trustee, ex-maleficio.
One who breaks a promise to marry, by means of which she has
obtained money from the plaintiff which she has invested in lands,
becomes a trustee of the amount, and it will be made a charge on the
lands so purchased. Edwards v,.Culbertson, Supreme Court of North
Carolina, November 22, 1892, SHEPHERD, C. J., 16 S. . Rep., 233.
8.

JURISDICTION.

9. Dissolution of Corpioration. See AccoUNT, sup ra.
AIARRIED WOME-N. TRUSTS FOR.

io. Separate Lquitable Estate; Power to Control.
A deed of settlement made by a feme sole in contemplation of marriage in trust for her sole and separate use provided, inter alia, that

EVIDENCE.

the grantor should occupy the premises and receive all the rents and
profits thereof "for the maintenance of herself and of any children that
may be hereafter born to her." There were other provisions aimed at the
exclusion of all marital rights of the husband. Subsequent to the
marriage the wife joined her husband in encumbering the land by a
deed of trust. Held: (I) that the power of a married woman over her
separate equitable estate is absolute unless restrained expressly -or
impliedly by the instrument creating the estate; (2) that her life estate
was properly bound, since the deed of settlement entitled her to the entire
profits of the trust, and did not vest in the children any joint interest:
Stace v. Bumgardner, Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, November
17, 1892, Lewis, P., 16 S. R. Rep., 252.

EVIDENCE.
Cases selected by

ARDRMUS STrWART.

ADMrSSIBIITY.
i. Evidence Illegally Obtained.
The fact that letters were taken from defendant's room by a detective
without authority df law, and without any warrant or order of Court,
does not rendea them admissible in evidence for the prosecution: following Gindrat v. People (fll. Sup.), 27 N. U. Rep., 1085; Siebert v. People,
Supreme Court of Illinois, CR.kiG, J.October 31, '1892, 32 N. R. Rep., 43T
2.
Mkfotion to Strike out Evidence.
A motion to "strike out" evidence that has been introduced in a
cai~se must be predicated upon some feature of irrelevancy,- incompetency, legal inadmissibility, or impertinency in the evidence itself.
Where evidence has been introduced for a plaintiff that in itself is pertinent, relevant, legal and proper, sb far as it goes toward making out
the plaintiff's case, but which, in the conception of the opposite party,
falls short, for want of proof of other necessary facts, of making out
the plaintiff's case, the proper practice is either to get an instruction
froni the Court to the jury to the effect that no recovery can be had
without proof of the missing facts, or else by a demurrer to the evidence
(or a motion' for a non-suit): Willcox v. Stephenson,'Supreme Court of
Florida, TAYLOR, J., November 3, 1892, II So. Rep., 659.
DOCUM ENTARY EWVDENCE.

3.

Notice to Produce-SubpanaDuces Teum.

A postmaster cannot refuse to obey a subpoena to produce in court
the record of his office containing the names of box-holders, on the
ground that it would be contrary to the regulations of the Post-Office
Department: Rice v. Rice, Court of Chancery of New Jersey, BIRD, V. C.,
October 28, 1892, 25 Atl. Rep., 321.
4.

Photograpkf.

A photograph or other picture, proved to be a correct representation of physical objects as td which testimony is adduced, is admissible

EVIDENCE.

S9

in evidence for the use of witnesses in explaining their testimony, and
thereby enabling the jury to understand the case more perfectly: Ortiz
v. State, Supreme Court of Florida, RANEY, C. J., October 12, 1892,
iI So. Rep., 6I.
HEARSAY.
5. 4dmuissions-)eclarations of Grantor.
In an action for obstructing a right of way, declarations of the original
owner at the tixi'e he took down the fence on the premises, to the effect
that the lane was "to be thrown out to a common and become uninclosed for the purposes of the public and for the purpose of going to the
depot," are admissible as part of the res gestc.
So, also, a declaration,
made either before or at the delivery of the deed, that "the land was to
be dedicated for depot purposes and public uses :" Spencer v. New York
and N. R. R. R. Co., Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut, May Term,
1892, CARPENTER, J., 25 Atl. Rep., 350.
6. Dying Declarations.
Dying declarations can be given in evidence in favor of the accused:
Mattox v. United States, Supreme Court of the United States, FULLER,
C. J., November 14, 1892, 46 U. S., 140.
7. Threats of Suicide by the Deceased.
On an indictment for murder by poisoning, evidence of the deceased
having within a year of his death and prior to his last sickness made
threats of an intention to commit suicide, is incompetent where the
declarations form no part of the r"es gesla, nor are within the rule admitting dying declaration: Seibert v. People, Supreme Court of Illinois,
October 3i, 1892, CRAIG, J., 32 Northeastern, 431.
OPINoN.
8. Handwriting.
Handwriting cannot be proved by comparison. In order to render
a witness competent to testify as to handwriting he must be acquainted
with the handwriting of the person charged to have written the disputed instrument, either from having seen him write, or having been
acquainted with his writings in business transactions; hut it is not necessary that he should directly state his familiarity with the party's handwriting. It is sufficient if this appears from his testimony: Riggs v.
Powell, Supreme Court of Illinois, fier curiam, November 2, 1892, 32
N. R. Rep., 482.
9.
fenlal Condition-on-expert Teslimzony. See WiLrs, 3.
Non-expert witnesses, who have known, frequently met and transacted business with a testatrix, and have observed her manner and
appearance at the time of mbaking the will and prior thereto, are competent to give their opinions as to her mental soundness at the time
the will was executed, although they were unable to give in detail any
conversation had with her: Appeal of Shanley. Supreme Court of
Errors of Connecticut, ANDR.WS, C. J., November i, 1892, 25 At]. Rep.,

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
When a witness has testified that she nursed a person during the
last few days before his death, and gives testimony as to his appearance,
actions and conversation, she is competent to give an opinion as to his
sanity during his illness, as her testimony shows that she had sufficient
opportunities of observation and means of knowledge on which to base
an opinion: Mull v. Carr, Appellate Court of Indiana, CRUmrPACKER, J.,
December r, 1892, 32 N. 1. Rep., 591.
xo. Question of Law-Opinion of Legal Profession.
The opinion of the legal profession on a question, given and acted
on for a great many years without litigation, is evidence of what the
law on such questions is: Venable v. Wabash Western Ry. Co., Supreme
Court of Missouri, SHERWOOD, C. J., November 14, 1892, 20 S. W. Rep.,
493.
PRODUCTION OF EVIDENCE.
xx. Orderof Testimony at Trial.
The order in which testimony is offered is to be determined by the
party offering it, where it is not shown to the court that some undue
advantage of the adverse party is thereby attempted to be taken:
McDaneld v. Lozi, Supreme Court of Illinois, WILKIN, J., October 31,
1892, 32 N. E. Rep., 423.
WITNESS.
12. Contradicting.
The rule that a party cannot discredit his own witness is not violated
by proving facts contrary to the testimony of such witness: Chester et
al.-v.Wilhelm et al., Supreme Court of North Carolina, MACRAE, J.,
November 29, 1892, x6 S. E. Rep., 229.
13. Deceased-Evidence of Testimony at Former Trial.
Where a party testifies in an action in the justice's court, and dies
before the trial, on appeal to the Circuit Court evidence of what his
testimony was is admissible: Lewis v. Roulo, Register of Deeds, Supreme
Court of Michigan, GRANT, J., November 18, 1892, 53 N. W. Rep., 622.

Non-resident-StenographicNotes of Testimony at Former
Trial.
The testimony of witness given on a former trial, and taken down
in full by an official court stenographer, is admissible in evidence upon
another trial of the same issues between the same parties, when it appears
that the witness is a non-resident, and not within the jurisdiction of the
court: Minneapolis Mill Co. v. Minneapolis and St. L. Ry. Co., Supreme
Court of Minnesota, MITCHE-LL, J., November 17, 1892, 53 N. W. Rep., 639.
14.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
Cases selected by MAYNE R. LONGSTRETH.
ELECTIONS.

x. Preservationof Ballots.
In a contest to invalidate an election returned as deciding to adopt
county organization, on the ground of improper counting of illegal
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votes, it was held, that while the ballots cast constitute the primary
evidence to determine rights of the parties, it must appear that they
were properly kept, and if they have been placed in a position to be
tampered with by interested parties, the burden of proof is on the party
offering them in evidence to show that they are in the same condition
as when sealed by the election officers: Albert v. Twohig, Supreme Court
of Nebraska, M&xwEr.,, J., November 2, 1892, 52 N. W. Rep., 582.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 7, 8; PROPERTY, 3, 9, 1o.
Change of Grade, Tax to Pay for.
A railway located in a street may be specially taxed to pay for the
improvement of the street by change of grade as being "contiguous
property:" Supreme Court of Illinois, October 31, 1892, SHOPE, J., 32
N. E. Rep., 372.
3. Ofiening-lEstimatingDamages.
It is proper for the jury in estimating damages to plaintiff from the
opening of a road through his land to take into consideration the special
benefits which will accrue to plaintiff by such opening, and if they are
great enough to counterbalance the injury, all damages are properly
denied him. Kings v. Burford, Supreme Court of Missouri, GANTT, J.,
November I4, 1892, 2o S. W. Rep., 459.
HIGHWAYS.
2.

LIcensE F-Es.

4. Recovery of Exrcessive Fees.
Where a municipality in good faith, but under a misapprehension of the law, demands a greater sum than it is legally entitled to for a
license to carry on a particular business, a person who, with knowledge
of the facts and without fraud, duress or extortion, voluntarily pays the
sum demanded, cannot recover back the excess: City of Camden z,
Green, Court of Er. and App. of New Jersey, November 14, 1892,
Dixo., J., 25 At1. Rep., 357.

PLEADING..
Cases selected by

ARDEMUS STEXART.

ANSwER.
I.

Conclusion of Law.

An answer in an action on a note given for the price of land, that
plaintiff falsely and fraudulently represented that the land was desirably
situated and of great value, is a conclusion of law where there is no
statement of what the real facts constituting fraud were: Baker-Boyer
National Bank v. Hughson et al., Supreme Court of 'Washington, HOYT,
J., October 22, 1892, 31 Pac. Rep., 423.
FOREIGN STATUTE.
2.

AXaterialilr.

In pleading a foreign statute it is only necessary to recite so much
thereof as ii material or necessary to the action or defense, and costs
therefor will be limited to the number of sheets required for that purpose: Summerside Bank v. Ramsay, Supreme Court of New Jersey,
WERTs, J., November 4, 1892, 25 At]. Rep., 274.

PRACTICE.

PRACTICE.
Cases selected by

ARDEMUS STEWART.

EQUITY.
INJUNCTION.
T.
To Try Title to Office.
The title to a public office, and the right to exercise its functions,
cannot be determined in an action for an injunction to restrain the exercise of such functions, but in proceedings in the nature of a writ of
quo warranto only: Burke v. Leland el at., Supreme Court of Minnesota, VANDERBURGH, J., November 23, 1892, 53 N. IV. Rep., 716.
MANDAMUS.

2.

To Try Title to Office.

When a candidate for an office has qualified, after being declared
elected by the inspectors of election, mandamus does not lie to try the
legality of his election: State ex rel. Mercer v. Sullivan et al., Supreme
Court of Wisconsin, CASSODAY, J., November 15, 1892, 53 N. W. Rep.,
677.
RES JUDICATA.
3. Successive Bills by Different Stockholders.
When one stockholder in a corporation files a bill to enjoin the
consummation of an agreement made by the said corporation with
other parties, in which suit the corporgition appears and answers, and the
suit is regularly heard and decided, the decision of the questions at issue
in that suit is conclusive as to similar questions raised in another bill filed
by another stockholder to enjoin the consummation of the same agreement, in the absence of proof of fraud or collusion in the decision of the
*former suit: Willoughby et al. v. Chicago Junction Railways & Union
Stockyards Co. et al., Court of Chancery of New Jersey, GREEN, V. C.,
October 12, 1892, 25 Atl. Rep., 277.

LAW.
ACTIONS.

4.

Limitation of.

When crops are overflowed by reason of a railway embankment, if
the nature of the embankment was such that the injury complained of
was uncertain and contingent, and such as might never happen, the.
damage was not original in the sense that it necessarily resulted from the
erection of the embankment, and consequently the statute of limitations
did not begin to run until the crops were destroyed: Following Ry. Co.
v. Biggs, 12 S. W. Rep., 331; 52 Ark., 240; St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry.
.Co. v. Yarborough, Supreme Court of Arkansas, MANSFIEILD, J., November i9, 1892, 20 S. V.. Rep., 515.
5.

Release of, Under Duress

A release by plaintiff of a cause of action against defendant will
not be held void because defendant threatened to " make complaint"
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and "send him to State's prison" if he refused, when the threats did
not specify any offence by plaintiff for which such imprisonment might
have been had: Kruschke v. Stefan, Supreme Court of Wisconsin, PINNqy,J., November 15, 1892, 53 N. W. Rep., 679.
APPEARANCE.

6. General, Eff'ect of.
A statement in the record that on the trial counsel appeared "for the
defendants," will be presumed to mean for all the defendants who had
answered, and in such case a general verdict for the defendants must be
construed in favor of all of them: Adams v. Sundby, el al., Supreme
Court of Minnesota, MITCHELL, J., December 2, 1892, 53 N. W. Rep., 761.
MOTIO-XS.

To Si,ike Out Evidence. See EV[DENCE, 2.

RES JUDICATA.

7. Issues not 3ade by Pleadings.
When the parties have, by consent, tried issues not made by the
pleadings, they are bound by the result to the same degree as if the
issues were within the pleadings: Erickson v. Fisher el al., Supreme
Court of Minnesota, MITCHELL, J., 'November 17, 1892, 58 N. W.
Rep., 638.
TRIAL.

8. Remarks of Counsel
Counsel must be allowed a reasonable latitude of argument, and while
it is improper for them to make appeals to the approval or disapproval of
the public as a consideration to weigh with the jury, reliance must be placed
upon the good sense and sound discretion of the trial judge to keep the
remarks of counsel within due and proper bounds. To warrant the interference of the appellate court the remark must be one which is clearly
prejudicial to the opposite party, and which can be justified under no possible theory of the case; and the court cannot fully judge of its propriety
where the objectionable remark is presented to its view alone, dissevered
from the context: Lake Erie, etc., R. R. Co. v. Middleton, Supreme Court
of Illinois, BAILEY, C. J., November 2, 1892, 32 N. E. Rep., 453.

PROPERTY.
Cases selected by ALFRED ROI,AND HAIG.
LAND.
CONTINGENT INTERESTS.
i.

Sale of.

The owner of a contingent interest iu land or money may sell it for
such sum as may be agreed upoi between himself and the purchaser, providing the latter does not stand toward him in a trust relation, and in
making the purchase acts in good faith: Whelen v. Phillips, Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania, STERRETT, J., October 3, 1892, 151 Pa., 312;,
31 W. N. C., 53; 25 Atl. Rep., 44.
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CONVEYANCE.
2.

Fraudulent.

A man, in contemplation of a second marriage, who has made no
representations as to his property as inducements for the woman to
marry him, may convey to his children by the previous marriage, as a
reasonable provision for them out of his estate, a. valuable portion of
his property; and the intended wife cannot have the conveyance set
aside as a fraud upon her, though she were not advised as to its being
made, if the grantor retain sufficient to insure reasonable support for
himself and her during life, and for her after his death should she be
the survivor: Alkire v. Alkire, Supreme Court of Indiana, OLDS, J.,
November 17, 1892, 32 N. E. Rep., 571.
DEED.
Constructive Notice in. See Infra, 5.
3. Covenant of Seisin.
A covenant of seisin is not broken by reason of the fact that the
land conveyed is described as being in the city of Albany, when in fact,
by reason of a prior change of.the city limits, it lay in another town, if
the grantor is seised of the land, and the description is sufficient to
identify it. The name of a town is not necessarily such an essential
and material pait of the description in a deed that it cannot be controlled by the particularity of the rest of the description: Perry v. Clark,
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusettts, LATHROP, J., October 22,
1892, 32 N. E. Rep., 226.
4.

Deed, Presumption of.

The signing, attestation and acknowledgment of a deed by the grantor,
and the recording of it, raise a presumption of delivery which cannot be
overcome by declarations of the grantor that the deed was not delivered.
After the execution and delivery of the deed the vendor's possession of the
land conveyed is in trust for the vendee, and the statute of limitations
will not begin to run until the vendor asserts an adverse holding by some
unequivocal act brought to the knowledge of the vendee : Ingles v. Ingles,
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, PAXSON, C. J., July 13, 1892, 150 Pa.,
397; 3o W. N. C., 490.

-

5. Exceptions to Grant.
A recital in a deed excepting from the grant all lots which have been
granted to any person for burial lots, is constructive notice to those
claiming under said deed that the burial lots were excluded from the
operation of the deed, although the deed of the burial lots was not
recorded until after the deed containing the exception: Hancock v.
McAvoy, Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, STERR.TT, J., October 3,
1892, 151 Pa., 439; W. N. C., 258; 25 At. Rep., 48.
6. Grantof Right of Sepulture.
A grant of the exclusive right of interment or sepulture in certain
burial lots subject to the regulations of a cemetery company, being a
mere license and incorporeal hereditament, conveys no such interest in
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the land as will support an action of ejectment: Hancock z. McAvoy,
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, STERRETT, J., October 3, r892, 151 Pa.,
46o; 31 W. N. C., 257; 25 Atl. Rep., 47.
7. H-abendum Refpugnant to Premises.
A life interest granted by deed, which is so fully, circumstantially
and precisely defined and limited in the premises that there can be no
mistake as to the intention of the grantor, will not be enlarged to a fee
by the provisions of a repugnant habendum: Karchner v. Hoy, Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania, STERRETT, J., October 3, i892, 151 Pa., 383; 31
XV. N. C., 57; 25 Att. Rep., 20.
8.

Mfay be Declareda Mflortgage.

The intention which exists when a deed is executed controls its
character, which a subsequent change of intention will not alter. If a
deed, absolute on its face, is executed as a security, it will be declared to
be a mortgage: Doughty v. Miller, Court of Chancery of New Jersey,
VAN FLEET, V. C., October iS, 1892, 25 Atl. Rep., 153. See also Potter
v. Langstrath, Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, McCoLLum, J., October
3, x892, 151 Pa., 216; 31 W. N. C., io8; 25 Atl. Rep., 76; Reeder v.
Trullinger, Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, HEvDRICK, J., October 3,
1892, 151 Pa., 287; 31 W. N. C., 103; 24 Atl. Rep., 11o4; Blake v.
Taylor, Supreme Court of Illinois, WILKIN, J., October 3, 1802, 32 N. E.
Rep., 401.
BASEMENT.
9. In Highway-Right of Abutting and N-on-abutting Owners
to Damages for Construction of Railroad-feasure of
Compensalion.
The owner of property abutting a public highway owns to the middle
of the street subject to the public right of travel thereon. If, therefore, a railroad ii constructed in the street it is an appropriation of
his estate therein, and an interference with access to the abutting property. But persons not owning abutting properties have only the right
of travel in the street, and are only affected by its appropriation as are
the public genefally, and hence have no claim for damages against
the railroad company. Where, therefore, a plaintiff owns land abutting
a highway which a railroad company adopts for its roadway, he can
recover for injuries to this tract; but he cannot recover consequential
damages to another tract which does not abut on the highway, though
the two tracts are connected by a right of way over intervening land of
another owner: Penna. Co. for Ins. v. Penna. Sch. Val. R. R. Co.,
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, WIIIAMS, J., October 3, 1892, STERRETT and 'MITCHELL, J J., dissenting, 151 Pa., 334; 31 W. N. C., 30.
10.

The entry of the State upon the land of an individual for the purpose
of constructing a highway gives it an easement in favor of the public for
purposes of travel, for which the owner is compensated. The land-owner
still retains the fee, but the servitude imposed restricts his enjoyment of
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it so that it cannot conflict with the public use. Whenever the abutting
owner is subjected to an additional servitude, he becomes entitled-to compensation for the actual injury sustained. If an elevated railroad is constructed above the highway, there may be no interference with the use by
the abutting land-owner of the property subject to the public easement;
but if the structure to an appreciable extent excludes light and air from
the abutting house, or imposes an additional servitude, the railroad company must compensate him for the injuries thus arising from the construction of its roadway. If only the highway is covered by the elevated
structure the measure of compensation is what has the railroad company
added to the public easement, and what new burden has it imposed on the
plaintiPs property abutting the highway: Jones v. Erie and Wyoming
Valley R. R. Co., Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, WIr.IAMS, J., October
3, 1892, 151 Pa., 30; 31 W. N. C., I; 25 AUt. Rep., 134.
ii. RiparianRighs in Navigable Stream.
The owner of land on the banks of a navigable river has no title to
the water or the power to be derived therefrom. But if the advantages
of his location, inseparable from the ownership of the land, are increased
for the purposes of business or pleasure by the propinquity of the stream,
they are as much his p~roperty as the land itself. By the diversion of the
stream by a neighboring riparian owner his land may, therefore, be
injured in a way not suffered by the public, and for this the neighboring
owner must make him compensation: Williams v. Fulmer, Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania, WILLIAMS, J., October 3, 1892, 151 Pa., 405; 31

W. N. C.,

70; 25

Atl. Rep., io3.

I.NJURIES TO LAND. See PRACTICE, 4; TORTS, II.
LATERAL SUPPORT. See TORTS, 6.
W4TER RIGHTS.
Water Supplied by NaturalForce.
12.
A: grant of certain land, "together with the privilege of drawing
water from a pipe laid in the ground from a well," on adjoining land
of the grantor, "as now psed," the water being supplied by gravitation, gives the grantee the right to draw water whenever the well,
remaining intact as a structure and capable of holding water, contains
water which will gravitate to the grantee's land, but there is no stipulation that the latter shall receive an adequate supply, nor does the grant
preclude the grantor from digging a reservoir on his land, though in so
doing he cuts off the supply from the well: Davis v. Spaulding, Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts, BARKER, J., December 3, 1892, 32 N. E.
Rep., 650.
Water Suplied by Hydraulic Ram.
13.
Complainant contracted with defendant to purchase a portion of his
land containing a stable and greenhouse, which were supplied with two
continuous streams of water forced through an underground pipe from two
hydraulic rams driven by waters of a spring on that part of the land
retained by defendant. The hydraulic rams were in operation at the
making of the contract, and although nothing was said with regard to the
flow of water the purchaser considered it a substantial inducement to the
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value of the property. On the day of the sale, some few hours before
the delivery of the deed, at a place distant from the premises, the water
was shut off: Held, that the flow of water so driven up by the rams was
an apparent and continuous easement, which passed with the land conveyed as necessary for the beneficial use of the premises; and with it, as
a secondary easement, the right to enter upon the land retained, to repair
and maintain the rams, and that the defendant did not alter the complainant's rights by stopping the flow at the stable just before the delivery of the deed: Toothe v. Bryce, Court of Chancery of NewJersey, PITNEY, V. C., October I8, 1892, 25 At]. Rep., 182.
MINES.
MINING CrAIM.
14. Right of Alien to Hold.
Mining interests and rights form no exception to the general rule
that the right to defeat a title to realty on the ground of alienage is
reserved only to the sovereign: Billings v. Aspen Mining and Smelting
Company, Circuit Court of Appeals of United States, Eighth Circuit,
SHIRAS, J., October 3, 1892, 52 Fed. Rep., 25r.
MriNls' WAGES.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, io.

S ATUTORY RIEQUIR EMENTS.
PROTECTION TO SHAFT.

See TORTS, 5.

PERSONAL PROPERTY.
BANK DEPoSIT.
15.
Gift Inter Vivos..
A deposit in bank in the flame of "Julia Cody, or daughter, Bridget
Bolin," does not warrant an inference of a gift to the latter; and though
the daughter had possession of the book for several years and supported
her infirm mother, in the absence of evidence of an intent to give and
of delivery of the fund represented by the book the title thereto remains
in the mother at her death: In re. Bolin, Court of Appeals of New
York, GRAY, J., November 29, 1892, 32 N. E. Rep., 626.

TORTS.
Cases selected by HENRY N.

SMALTZ.

DECEIT.

x. Exression of Opinion.
In an action on a note given for the price of land, the defence was
that the plaintiff falsely and fraudulently represented the land to be of
great value, and it appeared from the evidence that the plaintiff had
stated that the land was of great value and desirably situated, it was held
that this was a mere expression of opinion, and not a warranty: BakerBoyer Nat. Bank v. Hughson et al., Supreme Court of Washington,
October 22, 1892, per HAY, J., 31 Pac. Rep., 423.

TORTS..
NEGLIGENCE.

2. Abutting Owner, Liabilityfor Defedive Sidewalk.
The owner who has constructed in front of his building a board sidewalk, leaving a circular opening covered with an iron plate for the purposes of his business, is liable in damages to one who is injured in passing
over said sidewalk by striking the iron plate with her foot, slipping it
out of place, aid falling through the hole; and it is no defence to the
action that the city is liable to the injured party: McDaneld v. Logi,
Supreme Court of Illinois, October 31, 1892, per WILKIN, J., 32 N. U.
Rep., 423.
3. Defective Mfachinery.
Although machinery may have a defect, yet if that defect does not
interfere with the safe and proper use of the machiney with reference to
the purpose for which it was constructed, an injury to an employee's
hand while acidentally in contact with the defective part, but which was
very likely to occur, cannot-be attributed to negligence on the part of
the company in the construction of the machinery: Richmond and D.
R. R. Co. v'. Dickey, Supreme Court of Georgia, October 24, 1892, per
LUMPxIN,J., 16 S. R. Rep., 212.
4 IrrigatingDitches, Failureto Repiair.
Where a Colorado. statute provided that all owners of irrigating
ditches should keep them in repair, and should be liable for all damages
resulting from their refusal or neglect so to do, and defendant permitted
a break in his ditch to remain unrepairnd for three weeks, whereby plaintifPs land was overflowed, such conduct was negligence per se and
defendant was liable: Catlin Land & Canal Co. v. Best, Court of Appeals
of Colorado, October 24, 1892, per REED, J.., 31 Pac. Rep., 391.
5. Mfine Owner, Willful Violation'of Statutory Requirements.
Where by statute the operators or owners of all coal mines were
required to securely fence the top of each shaft by gates properly
covering and protecting such shaft, and the willful violation of the
xequirements causiiig injury or loss of life to any person was made
aqtionable, it was held thafEcontributory negligence was'no defence to a
-willful violation, and that by willful violation was meant a violation,
3knowingly and deliberately committed, to which the circumstance of the
-defendant having in good faith, for the protection of the entrance
boarded and fenced it, and arranged the care and operation of it to act as
.a gate or covering for the shaft, such protection being sufficient to protect a person who should should exercise ordinary care, did not make the
act of the defendant less willful: Catlett v. Young, Supreme Court of
Illinois, November 2, 1892, BAKER, J., 32 Northeastern, 4476. Municipal Corporations-ChangingGrade of Highway.
Where a city, informed of the loose character of the soil, excavated
a street so negligently as to take away the support of an adjoining lot,
causing the soil of the lot to slide into the street, the injury is direct, not
consequential, and the owner can recover damages therefor from the city,
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though the excavation was made before the adoption of any constitutional
provision for the compensation of the owner of property taken or
damaged for public use. The damages will cover injuries to the buildings also where the weight of the buildings did not contribute to the
sliding of the soil: Parke v. City of Seattle, Supreme Court of Washington, October ii, 1892, STILES, J., 31 Pac. Rep., 310.
But see Dillon, Mun. Corp., Secs. 990 and 991, and cases cited.

7.

Overflowing Lands. See
Railway Companies-Failurelo Signal.

A New York statute providing that the engineer who fails to ring
the bell or sound the whistle of a locomotive eighty rods before crossing
a highway shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, imposes the duty of giving
such signals solely on the engineer, and his failure to give them is not
negligence in law on the part of the company: Vandewater v. N. Y. & N.
3E. R. R. Co., Court of Appeals of New York, November 29, 1892, per
PECKHAM, J. (MAYNARD, J., dissenting), 32 N. R. Rep., 636.

8. Railway Comanies-Injuryto Passengers.
An electric railway company is not relieved from liability for damages
for injuries upon a passenger by its negligence, by the fact that he had not
paid his fare when he got on for the purpose of becoming a passenger
and was willing to pay, and would have paid but for the. failure of the
conductor to come to him, he being obliged to stand upon the foot board
owing to the crowded condition of the car: Cogswell v. West St. & N. E.
Electric Ry. Co., Supreme Court of Washington, October II, 1892, per
STILES, J., 31 Pac. Rep., 412.
RAILWAY COMPANIES.

g. Ejection of Passenger.
Where a station agent refused to open a ticket office and told the
applicant he could pay his fare on the cars, and he was forcibly ejected
from the train because he had not enough money to pay the excess of
fare required for not having a ticket, and was compelled to walk sixteen
miles in the snow, and was injured from fatigue and illness caused
thereby, the company is liable in damages: Lake Erie & W. Ry. Co. v.
Cloes, Appellate Court of Indiana, November 30, 1892, per CRUMPACKR,
1C.J., 32 N. R. Rep., 588.
SLANDER.
1o.

PrivilegedCommunication.

Where the business of an agent or an arbitrator was to appraise
propertyand ascertainthe state of accounts between landlord andtenant,
a communication by the landlord to such agent at the time of requesting
him to render his services, to the effect that the tenant had already stolen
two bales of cotton, and .he, the landlord, wished to get him off the
premises before he stole any more, it not appearing that the accounts
-between the parties embraced the two bales of cotton or any part of their
value, or any question concerning them, was irrelevant to the business
in hand, and was therefore not a privileged communication: Jones v.
Forehand, Supreme Court of Georgla, March 26, 1892, per SImmoNs, J.,
z6 S. ]E. Rep., 262.

TORTS.
TRESPASS.

ii. Railway Comanies-Construdioxof Road.
Where a railroad company constructs a ditch along its right of way,
whereby it diverts surface water, collected in a large basih through
which the road passse, froli the direction in which it naturally flows, and.
thereby overflows-land of an owner on the natural water course into
which the surface water so diverted is finally emptied, the company is
liable for the damage inflicted, and it is immaterial that the ditch was
necessary to the operation of the road, and that it was carefully constructed: Jenkins v. R. R. Co., i5S. . Rep., 193, followed. Staton v.
Norfolk & C. R. R. Co., Supreme-Court of North Carolina, November I7,
1892, per SHIZP-RD, 3., ib S. . Rep., 181.
TROVER AND CONVERSION.
12.
Carriersof Freight.
A carrier having received a-quantity of fire-arms and ammunition
for transportation to a place where a "strike" was in progress, consuited with the governor of the State, and under his advice did not deliver
the goods to the consignee, a store-keeper, but retained them and carried
them from the State. Held: in an action for their value (I)That a peti-'
tion in an action for conversion states a sufficient cause of action where
the plaintifPs ownerihip, the value of the goods, and the fact of the conversion is properly set forth, and an averment of a demand by the
plaintiff, and. a refusal by'the defendant is not necessary. (2) The
miotive by which a party was controlled in the conversion of property is
of no avail as a defense, though it may be shown when exemplary
damagep are claimed. (3) It is no defense to an action for the value of
the goods that they were tendered to the plaintiff after the conversion,
and then stolen without the negligence. of the carrier. Baltimore &
Ohio R. R. Co. v. O'Donnell, Supreme Court of Ohio, June' 28, x892,
per WILLIAMs, 3., 32 N. R. Rep., 476.

13.

Demand.

Where it appeared that plaintiff and defendant had a flock of sheek
in common running in defendant's pasture, and plaintiff asked defendant
if it was not time for a division of the sheep and could get none; and
six months later the plaintiff asked for a division and defendant said he
did not know whether plaintiff had any sheep, but afterward admitted
that he had sold them, it was held that the evidence was sufficient to
establish a demand: Sylvester v. Craig, Supreme Court of Colorado,
October 3A, 1892, per IovT,C. J.(1 Pac. Rep., 387).

